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Abstract – Sensor networks are increasingly seen as a so-
lution for a large number of environmental, security and
military monitoring tasks. Typically, in these networks,
noisy data from a number of local sensors is fused to re-
duce the uncertainty in the global picture. A central is-
sue in this information fusion is the decision of what data
should be shared between sensors, in order to maximise the
global gain in information, when the bandwidth of the com-
munication network is limited. In this paper, we study the
problem from a selﬁsh agent perspective. We show how the
uncertainty in the measurement of an event can be cast as
a utility function derived from the Kalman ﬁlter. We then
use the tools of mechanism design to engineer an incentive-
compatible mechanism that allows rational selﬁsh agents
to individually maximise their own utility, whilst ensuring
that the overall utility of the system is also maximised. We
apply the mechanism to multi-sensor target detection and
consider the complexity of ﬁnding an efﬁcient solution with
broadcast communication protocols.
1 Introduction
Multi-sensor networks (MSN) are being deployed in a wide
variety of application areas ranging from military sensing
to environmental monitoring and trafﬁc control. Such net-
works consist of a number of sensors connected via a com-
munication network. Each sensor is able to sense their lo-
cal environment, but can also make use of data transmitted
from neighbouring sensors in order to improve the accuracy
of their own measurements (e.g. by combining their own
noisy observation, with the observations from a number of
other sensors, in order to reduce the ﬁnal uncertainty).
Typically, however, the communication network that the
sensors use to trasmit and receive data has a limited capac-
ity. As a result, not all of the available information can be
distributed to all of the sensors. Thus, a key question posed
by information fusion within multi-sensor networks, is how
to make most effective use of this limited communication
bandwidth. To date, work addressing this issue, has mainly
concentrated on using cooperation among distributed sen-
sors (see section 2 for details). At its core, this approach in-
volves determining the exchanges of observed data between
the sensors that results in the maximum gain in information
across the whole sensor network.
However, this approach overlooks the fact that in some
applications each sensor may be individually-owned by dif-
ferent stakeholders. Such scenarios occur in applications
like trafﬁc control where each sensor is owned by a particu-
lar vehicle, in picosatellite projects where multiple compa-
nies own very small satellites monitoring a certain area, and
in multi-nation multi-platform military exercises, where the
military commanders of each platform are concerned with
the well-being of their own platform over others. In such
cases, the sensors may be operating in competitive rather
than cooperative environments, and, as such, may attempt
to optimise their own gain from the network, at a cost to
the overall performance of the entire network. This is es-
pecially true in networks where the bandwidth available for
transmission of data between the sensors is limited. In such
cases, sensors may not be willing to transmit any data at all,
since doing so yields no immediate beneﬁt and reduces the
amount of bandwidth that may be used to receive data from
other sensors.
Thus, against this background, we seek to design a sys-
tem that allows selﬁsh sensors to exchange data within a
bandwidth constrained network. We wish to ensure that
the resulting global performance maximises the informa-
tion gain of the entire system despite the selﬁsh actions of
individual sensors. To this end, we turn to the ﬁeld of mech-
anism design which concerns itself with the analysis and
design of systems in which the interactions between strate-
gic, autonomous and rational agents leads to predictable
global outcomes [1]. We thus model the sensors as agents
who are seeking to optimise their own utility and our aim
is then to ﬁnd a mechanism (i.e an allocation rule and pay-
ment scheme that is contingent on the reports from each
agent) that efﬁciently allocates the ﬂow of data within the
network.We approach the problem by ﬁrst describing a typical
scenario, based on target detection, where information fu-
sion needs to be carried out in a multi-sensor network. We
then formulate a valuation function that characterises the
value that an agent places on a particular piece of data orig-
inating from other agents. We then seek a mechanism that
uses this valuation function to determine the optimal allo-
cation of bandwidth within the network. Classically, within
multi-agent systems, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mech-
anisms have been used to perform efﬁcient resource allo-
cation when agents have private independent valuations.
However, the valuation function that we derive results in in-
terdependent valuations since knowledge about a particular
measurements precision affects the value that another agent
places on it, but this knowledge is only privy to the agent
having carried out the measurement. Thus, these mecha-
nisms cannot be applied in a straightforward manner, and
in tackling this problem, we advance the state of the art in
the following ways:
1. We formulate a novel valuation function based around
the information form of the Kalman ﬁlter [2] since this
isthesimplestandmostelegantwayoffusingdifferent
measurements of the same observation. This function
equates the valuation to the expected gain in informa-
tion when data from a number of sources is fused.
2. We extend the Generalised VCG mechanism devel-
oped in [3] to deal with the interdependent valua-
tions of data found in our scenario and captured by
our valuation function. We prove that this mechanism
is incentive-compatible (i.e. it incentivises agents to
truthfully reveal their signals) and thus achieves efﬁ-
ciency. Furthermore, we prove that the mechanism is
individually rational (i.e. agents in the system derive a
positive utility) and thus selﬁsh agents will rather join
the mechanism than opt out of it.
3. We show that the complexity of calculating the efﬁ-
cient allocation is dependent on the network topology
and communication protocol. Speciﬁcally, in the case
of a broadcast communication protocol we show that
the calculation can be solved exactly in polynomial
time.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2
describes related research that has been carried out in this
ﬁeld. In section 3 we describe a motivating problem sce-
nario that captures the essential features of information fu-
sion in multi-sensor networks and we develop a valuation
function for agents in this scenario. In section 4 we use the
tools of mechanism design to engineer a system that takes
into consideration selﬁsh agents having interdependent val-
uations. We should note here that this mechanism is not
speciﬁc to our problem scenario but can deal with any prob-
lem scenario where the agents have interdependent valua-
tions. In section 5 we prove that the mechanism developed
is efﬁcient, incentive-compatible and individually rational.
We also discuss the complexity of calculating the efﬁcient
allocation under an example communication protocol. We
conclude and discuss future work in section 6.
2 Related Work
Our work in this paper draws on two strands of research: in-
formation fusion in multi-sensor networks and mechanism
design under interdependent valuations.
Traditionally, work addressing information fusion in
multi-sensor networks has focused on using cooperative
agents to achieve good system-wide performance [4, 5, 6].
In these cases, the agents are assumed to truthfully com-
municate whatever information they have gathered to other
agents in the system. Competitive agents have been consid-
ered in the context of multi-sensor networks but this work
has typically focused on methods to control some global re-
source, such as minimising the power consumption within
the network [7, 8]. To date, therefore, the problem of max-
imising the overall information gain in a network of self-
ish sensors, where there are bandwidth constraints, has re-
ceived little attention.
Inordertoaddressthisproblemameasureofinformation
must be deﬁned. These measures are often represented as
a ‘distance’ and a number are commonly used in informa-
tion fusion [9]. For instance, the Kullback-Liebler distance
measures the impact of communicated data on both the pre-
cision and the mean of the prior probability density func-
tion. The Mahalanobis distance measures the impact that
communicated data may have relative to the uncertainty in
the prior. However both are functions of the data and the
data has to be communicated to the agent before it can cal-
culate the impact it will have on its own information. In
contrast, for our mechanism to work, the agents must be
able to value the data prior to its actual transmission. We
thus adopt another common measure of uncertainty, namely
the precision (or inverse covariance) of the data and derive
a valuation function based on this measure [2].
This valuation function necessarily results in interdepen-
dent valuations and the work on mechanism design pre-
sented here draws on research in interdependent value auc-
tions. In this area, Krishna [3] has considered efﬁcient al-
locations for single items with single-dimensional signals.
An alternative approach has been proposed by Dasgupta
andMaskinwhohavealsoconsideredthecaseoftwoitems,
again with single-dimensional signals [10]. Our scenario is
equivalent to an auction with multiple items with single-
dimensional signals. Thus we adopt the approach of Kr-
ishna (due to the less stringent information requirements
imposed on the agents and the more straightforward bid-
ding protocol) and we extend it to cover this new case.2
1
3
4
5
6
ROO
ROI
Sensor i
Target
Figure 1: A sample scenario of a multi-sensor network.
3 Target Detection Scenario
In this section, we ﬁrst describe our exemplar target detec-
tion scenario. We identify the important features of this sce-
nario that we then formalise as a multi-agent system prob-
lem. We then develop the valuation function based around
the information form of the Kalman ﬁlter.
3.1 Problem Description
We consider a scenario where a number of sensors are
tasked with detecting targets. The sensors each have a par-
tial and inaccurate view of the world and need to commu-
nicate with each other in order to increase this accuracy.
The ‘view of the world’ in this case is a view of the target
passing in the region that the sensors are monitoring. The
communication network that the sensors use is constrained
by a limited bandwidth. Therefore there is a need to glob-
ally decide on how to optimally allocate this bandwidth in
order to best satisfy the sensors’ overall goal of forming an
accurate view of the world.
In more detail, each sensor has two regions which they
consider. There is a region of observation (ROO) which is
the region where they can observe targets and a region of
interest (ROI) which they wish to monitor. Figure 1 depicts
a typical instance of a scenario where the ROI of sensor 1
is shown and there is a target within this ROI. We can ob-
serve that agent 1 can already know about this event in its
ROI since this overlaps (as it usually does) with its ROO.
However, due to noise inherent in the measurement process,
agent 1 will have some uncertainty in its observation (e.g.
the position, type or speed of the target may be described
by a probability distribution rather than an absolute value).
Agent 1 can however decrease this uncertainty by gaining
data about the target from other agents, namely agents 3
and 5 (which also have the target in their ROO). However,
ifagent1canonlyreceivedatafromoneofthesetwoagents
due to bandwidth limitations, it will then have to decide as
to which agent to gain the data from. This decision making
process is further complicated if the other agents also have
to make similar decisions. Thus different ﬂows of data (i.e.
descriptions of which sensors will transmit data and along
which path this data will ﬂow) will yield different results in
terms of the total reduction of the uncertainty (or the equiv-
alent increase of information). Given this, the high level
representation of our problem is then to allocate the ﬂow of
data within the bandwidth constraints imposed by the com-
munication network so as to optimise the overall gain in
information each sensor has about its ROI.
We tackle this problem by ﬁrst modelling it as a multi-
agent system. Each sensor is then viewed as an agent i,
within a set of agents I, which has data infi and a function
xi(infi) that characterises how accurate this data is. The
data has a size and thus a bandwidth requirement of bwi.
We initially consider the simplest communication protocol
that exhibits a bandwidth constraint, and thus, we assume a
broadcast protocol whereby any sensor can simultaneously
transmit to all other sensors. The total bandwidth available
for the transmission of the data is such that only a subset of
the sensors can actually transmit their data.
In order to characterise this problem we ﬁrst need to
make a few assumptions about this scenario:
• The time taken in calculating the allocation of data and
in communicating between agents is small compared
to the time taken for another target to appear. This
allows us time frames where the mechanism can be
implemented.
• Theagentshaveperfectandcommonknowledgeabout
the sensor-network topology and their neighbours.
This removes the problem of neighbour discovery in
communication systems.
These assumptions thus permit us to concentrate solely on
the issue of allocating the ﬂow of data under the bandwidth
constraints. We now need a way for each agent to value
the data received from different agents based around the
measure of data accuracy, xi.
3.2 Valuation Function
We now develop our valuation function based on the in-
formation form of the Kalman ﬁlter. Now, in the stan-
dard Kalman ﬁlter, observations are of the form z(t)=
H(t)y(t)+n(t) where y(t) is the state of the system at
time t, H(t) is the linear observation model and n(t) is a
zero mean random variable drawn from a normal distribu-
tion with variance R. The covariance update component,
P−1(t | t), of the information form of the Kalman ﬁlter for
N observations is:
P−1(t | t)=P−1(t | t−1)+
N 
j=1
HT(j)R−1(j)H(j) (1)
The summation in the above expression represents the de-
crease in covariance and thus the gain ininformation at time
t when all the N observations are fused. In the case of our
problem the value of receiving data from another agent canthus be represented by the gain in information this observa-
tion engenders.
In order to achieve an efﬁcient allocation, this gain in in-
formation must be calculated from the measure of the data
accuracy prior to actually fusing it. Thus, we can repre-
sent the measure of accuracy of a data, xj, as its covariance
which is calculated from the covariance of its observation,
R(j):
xj = HT(j)R−1(j)H(j) (2)
Thus the gain in information of agent i, when all relevant
data is transmitted to it and is fused, can be expressed as
a sum of this measure of accuracy provided by each of the
other agents:
vi(x)=xi +

j∈−i
xj (3)
where −i = I\i.
Equations 2 and 3 thus cast our valuation function in the
Kalman ﬁlter form. However, we need to modify this so
as to incorporate the characteristics of our scenario. This
is because all observations may not fall in an agent’s ROI
and furthermore an agent may not be able to receive all the
data as a result of the bandwidth constraints of the commu-
nication network. Deﬁning αij as the probability that the
data observed by agent j is relevant to agent i and a vec-
tor f as describing the ﬂow of data in the network, then the
expected valuation is :
vi(x,f)=xi +

j∈−i
fijαijxj (4)
By slight abuse of notation, we shall hereafter refer to the
expected valuation vi(.) as v(.).
From the valuation function, we can observe that the val-
uation of an agent i depends on xj, which are signals mea-
sured by other agents. This puts us ﬁrmly in the realm of
interdependent valuations. As a result, there are two con-
ditions which are necessary in order to achieve an efﬁcient
allocation when considering selﬁsh agents [11, 10]. Firstly:
∂vi(f,x)
∂xj
=0 ∀i,j ∈I (5)
and secondly:
∂vi(f,x)
∂xi
>
∂vj(f,x)
∂xi
∀i,j ∈I ,i = j (6)
The ﬁrst condition is automatically satisﬁed in our case
since new data cannot decrease information. In the case of
the second condition, it implies that we need to restrict an
agent’s ROI to its ROO. Otherwise, there may be an event
outside its ROO which falls in its ROI such that data from
another agent has a greater effect on its utility that its own
data. This condition is necessary because otherwise self-
ish agents may proﬁtably lie about their observed data and
derive positive utility from it. Furthermore, the overlap be-
tween the agent’s ROO’s must be such that this condition is
satisﬁed (i.e.

j∈−i αij < 1). This means that the ROO
of any agent can not be entirely overlapped by the ROO of
other agents (i.e. no agent is redundant).
4 The Mechanism
As we have seen in section 3.2, the agents’ utilities are in-
terdependent, but, nevertheless, they can still be used to
develop an efﬁcient auction since they satisfy the condi-
tions of equations 5 and 6. Furthermore, the agents only
provide a single-dimensional measure, xi, for the informa-
tion they have and thus the impossibility result in [12] does
not apply. Given this, we now detail a mechanism that is
incentive-compatible, efﬁcient and individually-rational for
the case of multiple goods with single dimensional signals.
Our mechanism proceeds as follows:
1. Each agent i transmits to the centre its valuation func-
tion vi(f,x) for all the possible allocations of the in-
formation ﬂow f ∈Fwhere F is the set of all feasible
ﬂows.
2. Each agent i also transmits its observed signal  xi. 1
3. The centre then computes the optimal allocation f∗
0
which is calculated as:
f∗
0 = argmax
f∈F


i∈I
vi(f, x)

(7)
4. The centre also calculates the payment ri made by
each agent i. To do this, the centre ﬁrst ﬁnds the m
next best allocations as the signal xi is decreased until
the presence of i makes no difference to the alloca-
tions. That is, ﬁnd allocations f∗
1 ...f∗
m and the signal
values zl
i such that:
zl
i =i n f

yi :

i∈I
vi(f∗
l ,y i,x−i)
=

i∈I
vi(f∗
l+1,y i,x−i)
 (8)
(where each allocation f∗
l is different) until
zm
i =i n f

yi :

i∈I
vi(f∗
m−1,y i,x−i)
=

i∈I
vi(f∗
m,y i,x−i)
 (9)
1Of course,  xi may not be equal to xi since the agent may strategise
and lie about this value. However, we prove in section 5 that it is the
best strategy for the agent (i.e. it maximises the utility of the agent) to set
 xi = xi and report this value truthfully.where the allocation f∗
m is the optimal allocation when
i does not exist i.e.
f∗
m = argmax
f∈F

j∈I\i
vj(f,x)
Then the transfer to buyer i is
ri =
m−1 
l=0
 
j∈I\i
vj(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i)
−

j∈I\i
vj(f∗
l+1,zl
i,x−i)
	 (10)
The above scheme rests upon making an agent derive a
utility equal to the marginal contribution that its presence
makes to the whole system of agents (which is the same in-
tuition as used in the VCG [13]). Thus the additional part
of this mechanism is to take into account the effect that an
agent’s signal xi has on the overall utility of the system.
This mechanism is general in that it can be also applied
to the case of independent valuations. In our scenario,
such valuations arise when the regions of observation of the
sensors do not overlap, and the agents are simply collect-
ing, rather than combining, observations. In this case, the
mechanism reduces to the well-known multiple-good VCG
mechanism if we take the case of private values i.e when
vi(x,.)=vi(xi). Then the optimal allocation is:
f∗
o = argmax
f∈F


i∈I
vi(f,xi)

(11)
To calculate the payment scheme, we ﬁrst note that since xi
only affects i, then repeatedly decreasing xi until the stop-
ping condition on equation 9 does not change the valuation
of the other agents −i on the different allocations. This
then implies that in the payment, as computed by equation
10, all the terms cancel each other except for the ﬁrst and
last leading to a payment of:
ri =

j∈I\i
vj(f∗
0,x j) −

j∈I\i
vj(f∗
m,x j) (12)
This is exactly the payment scheme used in the classical
VCG mechanism.
5 Properties of the Mechanism
In this section, we discuss both the economic and compu-
tational properties of our mechanism and their implication
for our multi-sensor network scenario.
5.1 Economic Properties
The mechanism that we present maintains the same de-
sirable economic properties of the VCG mechanism, but
as discussed earlier, does so in the face of interdependent,
rather than independent, valuations. Speciﬁcally:
1. The mechanism is incentive-compatible in ex-post
Nash Equilibrium. It is a best response strategy for
the agents to reveal their types (xi) truthfully even af-
ter they have complete information about the types of
the other agents (x). This is a strong equilibrium in
that agents do not need to form prior beliefs about how
other agents will behave [13] and they do not need to
indulge in any strategic behaviour.
2. The mechanism is individually rational. A selﬁsh
agent will join the mechanism rather than opt out of
it, since the utility derived by the agents within the
mechanism is never less than that of agents outside the
mechanism.
3. The mechanism is efﬁcient. Since the agents truthfully
reveal their types to the centre, the optimal allocation
of communication bandwidth can be calculated and
thus the information gain of the network as a whole
is maximised despite the selﬁsh actions of the individ-
ual agents.
For completeness, proofs of these results are included in the
appendix, whilst a more general and detailed discussion of
these results are presented in [14].
5.2 Computational Properties
In order to achieve the economic properties discussed in the
previous section, the centre is required to compute the op-
timal allocation of bandwidth in equations 7, 8 and 9. This
involves solving a combinatorial optimisation problem, and
thus, the complexity of this task determines the computa-
tional load on the centre. Here we analyse the complexity
when considering a broadcast communication network (the
simplest network conﬁguration which exhibits a bandwidth
constraint).
In a broadcast communication protocol, any individual
agent may simultaneously transmit its data to all other
agents. To prevent several agents transmitting simultane-
ously, and thus interfering with each other, each time frame
is typically divided into time slots of differing length and
individuals are allocated particular slots depending on their
bandwidth requirements. When the total bandwidth re-
quired by the agents exceeds that available, only a subset
of agents are able to transmit their data. The role of the
optimisation is to select the subset that maximises the total
gain in information of the sensors.
In order to examine the complexity of this optimisation
task, we can cast it as an instance of the knapsack problem,
{(s1,v 1), (s2,v 2), (s3,v 3), ..., (sn,v n),K }, where K is
the knapsack capacity and sj and vj are the size and value
of item j. The goal is to choose a subset of items of maxi-
mumvaluewiththetotalsizeatmostK. Inourcase, sj rep-
resents the bandwidth requirement of each agent, bwj, and
K represents the total bandwidth available, bwtotal. Sincewe are assuming that the total bandwidth available is in-
sufﬁcient to allow all the agents to transmit their data, then 
j bwj >b w total.
In order to map our problem into a knapsack problem, we
must express the value which each agent contributes to the
total by transmitting its data. Since this is a broadcast com-
munication protocol, then we know that if fij =1for any
i, then fij =1 ∀i ∈I . Hence, if an agent j is transmitting
data, then each of the other agents I\j will derive a utility
of αijxj. Thus, the value of each item, vj, is represented
by the total utility that it contributes to all other agents:
vj =

I\j
αijxj. (13)
Having thus cast the problem as a knapsack problem, we
can use standard results to solve it. Although the knapsack
problem is known to be NP-Complete, it is possible to cal-
culate an exact solution in pseudo-polynomial time using
dynamic programming [15]. This algorithm scales linearly
with the number of agents and thus the optimum can be
calculated efﬁciently, even in very large sensor networks.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have addressed the problem of information
fusion within a bandwidth-limited multi-sensor network.
Since in many real applications the sensors are individually
owned by different stakeholders, we have modelled them
as selﬁsh rational agents who are seeking to maximise their
own gain through exchanging and receiving data from oth-
ers sensors within the network. We presented a motivating
problem scenario based of multi-sensor target detection and
developed utility functions for these sensors based on the
information form of the Kalman ﬁlter.
In order to ensure good global performance of the sensor
network under our assumption of selﬁsh sensors, we used
a mechanism design approach to incentivise selﬁsh sensors
to act in a manner which results in the maximum informa-
tion gain across the entire network. Since the utility func-
tion of sensors within a multi-sensor network are necessar-
ily interdependent, we needed to extend the standard VCG
mechanism to deal with this whilst conserving its desirable
properties, namely efﬁciency, incentive-compatibility and
individual rationality. The resulting mechanism was proved
to have these properties and is applicable to any scenario
where multiple goods (i.e. in this case observations of tar-
gets) are to be allocated. We showed that the mechanism
deals with both interdependent and independent valuation
scenarios, and reduces to the well-known VCG mechanism
in the latter case. Finally, we analysed the computational
complexity of ﬁnding the optimal solution required by the
mechanism. In the case of a broadcast communication pro-
tocol, we showed that it reduces to the knapsack problem
and thus an exact solution can be found in polynomial time.
As future work, we are investigating how we can apply
the techniques developed here in richer information fusion
scenarios. One such extension is understanding how intro-
ducing multi-dimensionality to the valuation function leads
to a sub-optimal allocation [12]. Another is understanding
how we can extend the valuation function derived here to
handle instances in which the agents communicate previ-
ously fused information as well as direct observations.
Our ultimate aim in this work is to extend the mechanism
into a distributed one in which there is no central allocator
of bandwidth. These distributed mechanisms are attractive
sincetheyhaveanumberofadvantagesovercentralisedone
in terms of robustness to failure and scalability. However,
such a mechanism will need to consider how selﬁsh agents
might manipulate the communication of messages and the
computation of the allocation for their own gain. As such,
according to the revelation principle, the existence of the
mechanism that we described here, is a necessary condition
for the existence an equivalent distributed mechanism that
has the same properties [16].
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Appendix
Proof of Economic Properties
In this section we present proofs of the economic properties
of the mechansim, namely that it is incentive-compatible,
efﬁcient and individually rational.
Proposition 1. The mechanism is incentive-compatible in
ex-post Nash Equilibrium.
A mechanism is incentive-compatible in ex-post Nash
Equilibrium if it is a best response strategy for the players
to reveal their types truthfully even after they have complete
information about the signal values x.
Proof. Let v−i(.)=

j∈−i(vj(.)) and vI(.)= 
i∈I(vi(.)). Suppose now that all players except i report
their signals truthfully (i.e.  x−i = x−i). Let the optimal
allocation when i reports truthfully be f∗
0. We can then
analyse the utility ui(.) that agent i derives by reporting
a certain  xi. There are two cases that should be analysed
namely when  xi <x i and  xi >x i. The utility of an agent
on reporting  xi = xi is :
ui(f∗
0,x)=vi(f∗
0,x)+
m−1 
l=0


v−i(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i)−
v−i(f∗
l+1,zl
i,x−i)

(14)
Now suppose an agent reports  xi  = xi but this does
not change the optimal allocation f∗
0 implemented. Then,
ui(f∗
0,x)=ui(f∗
0,  xi,x−i). This is because, then the
agent will derive the same value vi(f∗
0,x) if the allocation
does not change and the payment will be the same as the
signals z0
i ...zm
i are computed by the centre. Now consider
the case that an agent reports  xi <x i such that this changes
the allocation. Then some other optimal allocation, which
is necessarily one of the allocations f∗
1,...,f m is imple-
mented. Denote the resulting allocation when  xi <x i as
f∗
n, i.e. z
n−1
i <  xi ≤ z
n−1
i .
The utility that the agent gets from this new allocation is
then:
ui(f∗
n,x)=vi(f∗
n,x)+
m−1 
l=n


v−i(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i)−
v−i(f∗
l+1,zl
i,x−i)

(15)
The difference, Dn = ui(f∗
0,x)−ui(f∗
n,x) between truth-
ful reporting and over-reporting (as given by equations 14
and 15 respectively) is:
Dn = vi(f∗
0,x) − vi(f∗
n,x)
+
n−1 
l=0


v−i(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i) − v−i(f∗
l+1,zl
i,x−i)

= vi(f∗
0,x)+v−i(f∗
0,z0
i ,x−i) − v−i(f∗
n,zn
i ,x−i)
− vi(f∗
n,x)+
n 
l=1


v−i(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i)
− v−i(f∗
l ,z
l+1
i ,x−i)

Since
∂v−i(f
∗
l ,x)
∂xi ≥ 0, we thus have:
Dn ≥ vi(f∗
0,x)+v−i(f∗
0,z0
i ,x−i)
− v−i(f∗
n,zn
i ,x−i) − vi(f∗
n,x)But, given that
∂v−i(.)
∂xi <
∂vi(.)
∂xi , we then have that:
Dn >v i(f∗
0,x)+v−i(f∗
0,x)
− v−i(f∗
n,zn
i ,x−i) − vi(f∗
n,z0
i ,x−i)
Using the condition that
∂v−i(f
∗
l ,x)
∂xi ≥ 0 again leads to:
Dn >v I(f∗
0,x) − vI(f∗
n,z0
i ,x−i)
>v I(f∗
0,z0
i ,x−i) − vI(f∗
n,z0
i ,x−i)
By the optimality of f∗
0 (i.e f∗
0 is always calculated such
that it maximises the sum of valuations as per equation 7),
and we thus have Dn > 0.
On the other hand, if an agent reports  xi >x i and this
induces an allocation f∗
−n, then the utility it derives is :
ui(f∗
−n,x)=vi(f∗
−n,x)+
m−1 
l=−n


v−i(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i)−
v−i(f∗
l+1,zl
i,x−i)

(16)
The difference, D−n = ui(f∗
0,x) − ui(f∗
−n,x) between
truthful reporting and under reporting (as given by equa-
tions 14 and 16 respectively) is
D−n = vi(f∗
0,x) − vi(f∗
−n,x)
−
−1 
l=−n


v−i(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i) − v−i(f∗
l+1,zl
i,x−i)

= vi(f∗
0,x)+v−i(f∗
0,z
−1
i ,x−i) − vi(f∗
−n,x)
− v−i(f∗
−n,z
−n
i ,x−i)
+
−1 
l=−n+1


v−i(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i) − v−i(f∗
l ,z
l+1
i ,x−i)

Since
∂v−i(f
∗
l ,x)
∂xi ≥ 0, we thus have:
D−n ≥ vi(f∗
0,x)+v−i(f∗
0,z
−1
i ,x−i)
− vi(f∗
−n,x) − v−i(f∗
−n,z
−n
i ,x−i)
Then:
D−n ≥ vi(f∗
0,x)+v−i(f∗
0,x)
− vi(f∗
−n,x) − v−i(f∗
−n,z
−n
i ,x−i)
But
∂v−i(.)
∂xi <
∂vi(.)
∂xi and thus:
D−n >v i(f∗
0,x)+v−i(f∗
0,x)
− vi(f∗
−n,z
−n
i ,x−i) − v−i(f∗
−n,x)
>v i(f∗
0,x)+v−i(f∗
0,z
−n
i ,x−i)
− vi(f∗
−n,x) − v−i(f∗
−n,x)
>v I(f∗
0,x)+v−i(f∗
−n,x)
Again, by optimality of f∗
0,w eh a v evI(f∗
0,x) −
vI(f∗
−n,x) ≥ 0 and hence D−n > 0. We thus see that i
derives highest utility when reporting  xi = xi.
Proposition 2. The mechanism is efﬁcient.
This implies that the centre ﬁnds the outcome such that
f∗ = argmax
f

j∈I
uj(f,x) (17)
Proof. The above is a result of the incentive-compatibility
of the mechanism. Since the goal of the centre is to
achieve efﬁciency, then given truthful reports, the centre
will achieve efﬁciency.
Proposition 3. The mechanism is individually rational.
A mechanism is individually rational if there is an incentive
for agents to join it rather than opting out of it. We begin by
assuming that the utility an agent derives from not joining
the mechanism is 0. Then, we need to prove that the utility
an agent derives in the mechanism is always ≥ 0.
Proof. Giventhattheagentsareincentivisedtoreporttruth-
fully, an agent i derives utility:
ui(f∗
0,x)=vi(f∗
0,x)+
m−1 
l=0


v−i(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i)−
v−i(f∗
l+1,zl
i,x−i

= vi(f∗
0,x)+
m−1 
l=0


vI(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i)−
vI(f∗
l+1,zl
i,x−i)

−
m−1 
l=0


vi(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i)
− vi(f∗
l+1,zl
i,x−i)

(18)
Since vI(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i)=vI(f∗
l+1,zl
i,x−i) (from equation
8):
ui(f∗
0,x)=vi(f∗
0,x) −
m−1 
l=0


vi(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i)
− vi(f∗
l+1,zl
i,x−i)

= vi(f∗
0,x) − vi(f∗
0,z0
i ,x−i)
+ vi(f∗
m,zm
i ,x−i)
+
m−1 
l=1


vi(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i)
− vi(f∗
l ,z
l+1
i ,x−i)

(19)
From equation 9, vi(f∗
m,zm
i ,x−i)=0 . Furthermore,
since
∂ui(K,x)
∂xi ≥ 0, then
m−1
l=1


vi(f∗
l ,zl
i,x−i) −
vi(f∗
l ,z
l+1
i ,x−i)

> 0 and vi(f∗
0,x) − vi(f∗
0,z0
i ,x−i) >
0. Hence ui(f∗
0,x) > 0.